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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Appellate Case No. 20070278-CA 
RONNIE TODD MAY, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Stalking, a class A 
misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-5-106.5. The Defendant was found 
guilty by a jury on January 11, 2007, and was sentenced on February 21, 2007. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(e)(2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. WERE THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE 
DENIED DEFENSE COUNSEL HIS REQUEST TO 
SUBMIT REASONABLE EVIDENCE DURING 
TRIAL. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of law whether the Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial 
court prohibited the Defendant from entering into evidence the minute entry of 
the court order in the stalking case and when the trial court prohibited the 
Defendant from arguing his theory of the case to the jury. "[Constitutional 
arguments regarding . . . due process present questions of law that we review 
for correctness." State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App. 381 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003)(citations and quotations omitted). This Court should apply "close 
judicial scrutiny and review [] the trial court's decision for correctness." State 
v. Madsen, 57 P.3d 1134, 1135, (Utah Ct. App. 2002)(brackets in original). 
II. WERE THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE 
MADE VAGUE AND UNCLEAR STATEMENTS 
REGARDING COURT ORDERS AND FAILED TO 
NOTIFY THE DEFENDANT OF PROSCRIBED 
CONDUCT. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter 
of law whether the Defendant's due process rights were violated by the entry of 
a vague and unclear order in a stalking injunction case. "[Constitutional 
arguments regarding . . . due process present questions of law that we review 
for correctness." State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App. 381 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003)(citations and quotations omitted). This Court should apply "close 
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judicial scrutiny and review [] the trial court's decision for correctness." State 
v. Madsen, 57 P.3d 1134, 1135, (Utah Ct. App. 2002)(brackets in original). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fifth Amendment 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
U.C.A. §76-5-106.5 - Stalking 
(i) intentionally or knowingly violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to 
title 77, chapter 3a, stalking injunction. 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving 
a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with violation of a stalking 
injunction, a class a misdemeanor. (R. 001). The Defendant pled not guilty, 
and a jury trial was held on January 11, 2007, in front of the Honorable Ernie 
W. Jones. The Defendant was convicted. (R. 075). On February 21, 2007, the 
Defendant was sentenced to a six months in jail sentence which was stayed and 
the Defendant was put on probation. (R. 075) The final commitment and order 
was signed on February 27, 2007. (R. 081). On March 23, 2007, the Defendant 
filed a notice of appeal. (R. 088). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 19, 2003, a stalking injunction was issued by a trial court in 
Weber County enjoining the Defendant from stalking or having any contact 
with his ex-wife Tammy May. The Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal 
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on March 31, 2003. On April 3, 2003, the court clerk contacted the Defendant 
and made the following notation in the court docket: 
... he says that— it does say that on March 31/03, it says, filed, 
respondents appeal. But then it says that Virginia [the court clerk] 
called the respondent regarding his appeal. He stated that it was an 
objection to the commissioner's recommendation and that 
additional motions for change of venue will be filed. Per Judge 
Lyon, hold until those further motions are filed. (R. 100 /87) 
Nothing further occurred in this case until November 21, 2005. On that day the 
victim was at her house, the address of which was listed in the stalking 
injunction, and she observed the Defendant driving down the street slowly in 
his vehicle, with the window down and heard him say, "I need to talk to you". 
(R. 100 /55) According to the witness he was approximately 30 feet away from 
the victim. (R. 100/55). 
On two other occasions, in late November or early December 2005, the 
Defendant visited the brother-in-law of the victim Tammy May at the brother-
in-law's home. The purpose of the visit was to talk about subleasing an office. 
(R. 100/68) During the conversation with the brother-in-law the Defendant 
started to talk about Tammy May. (R. 100 169) 
Based upon those two incidents, the Defendant was charged with the 
violation of a stalking injunction. 
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Trial occurred on January 11, 2007, and during the course of the trial the 
above described testimony was placed before the jury. After the State had 
rested their case, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case based upon the 
fact that the State could not prove that the Defendant was on reasonable notice 
that a valid stalking injunction was in place at the time of the alleged offense. 
The defense asked that the above quoted court docket entry be entered 
into evidence and presented to the jury. (R. 100/91) The prosecution objected 
to that entry. (R. 100/91) Thereafter there was a lengthy discussion involving 
the admission of the court docket entry into evidence and the admission into 
evidence of the fact that the Defendant had filed a notice of appeal. (R. 100 
/91-96) finally the court ruled that neither the court docket entry nor the fact 
that the Defendant had filed a notice of appeal would be allowed to be 
presented to the jury. (R. 100 196) Based upon that ruling that "I'm not even 
gonna allow you to go there" (R. 100 /96), the Defendant rested and was forced 
argue to the jury that the items testified to by the prosecution witnesses did not 
occur. The Defendant was precluded from arguing those things specifically 
excluded from the jury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant in the present case was charged with the violation of a 
stalking injunction issued previously by the court. During the course of the trial 
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the Defendant's attorney requested that a court docket entry from the court 
which issued the stalking injunction be entered into evidence in the criminal 
case. This court docket entry indicated that the court had put the matter on hold 
until further notice and also indicated that the court had called the Defendant to 
inform him of this action. While the court order was admittedly vague and 
subject to several interpretations, the Defendant believes that his constitutional 
rights to fair trial and due process should have allowed him to, at a minimum, 
introduce the court order into evidence and argue to the jury that a reasonable 
person could have believed that the stalking injunction was not in force at the 
time and therefore the Defendant could not have possessed the requisite mens 
rea for the offense. 
The trial court not only refused to allow the introduction into evidence of 
the minute entry but also specifically prohibited the Defendant from arguing 
the ambiguity of the court order to the jury. This failure by the trial court 
constituted a violation of the Defendant's statutory, case law, and constitutional 
rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE DENIED 
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DEFENSE COUNSEL TO SUBMIT REASONABLE 
EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
in relevant part: "that no person shall be deprived of liberty or property without 
due process of law." The due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes the right to a fair and public trial conducted in a 
competent manner. The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined 
certain elements that are essential to a fair trial; one element includes providing 
sufficient evidence and arguments in behalf of the defendant. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Larsen, 2005 UT App. 
201, j^4, 113 P.3d 998 held "Generally speaking, trial counsel is given 
'considerable latitude in making argument to the jury.'" State v. Young, 853 
P.2d 327 (Utah 1993). In addition to the considerable latitude given to counsel 
in making argument, the court in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 
1987) stated that counsel may also "discuss fully from their viewpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom." Id. 
Additionally, a criminal defendant is given the due process guarantee of 
the right to attempt to establish any reasonable defense. In the case of State v. 
Spillers, 2007 UT 13 If 12, 152 P.3d 315, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
Utah Court of Appeals in holding: 
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In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), this court held that 
when the defense requests an instruction on a lesser included 
offense, the instruction "must be given if (i) the statutory 
elements of greater and lesser included offenses overlap ... and 
(ii) the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense."(emphasis added) 
The Court recognized the rights of a criminal defendant in stating: 
[A] defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion. 
State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980). "The ultimate 
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt remains on the state, whether defendant offers any 
evidence in an effort to prove affirmative defenses or not." Id; 
see also State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981); State v. 
Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah 1975); People v. Tracy, 1 Utah 
343, 346 (Utah 1876). "It is sufficient... that the evidence or lack 
thereof creates a reasonable doubt as to any element of the 
crime." Torres, 619 P.2d at 695; see also State v. Knoll, 111 P.2d 
211, 214 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 
1977). A defendant is not required to testify at all, nor is he 
required to present any evidence at trial; he "may simply point to 
ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the 
State and require the State to prove every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.55 State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, 29, 154 
P.3d 788.... As long as the evidence presented at trial supports a 
defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational basis for a 
verdict on the lesser included offense, a defendant is entitled to 
the jury instruction if he requests it. (State v. Spillers at f^ 19 
emphasis added) 
Likewise, in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah, 1980) the Court held, 
"Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the crime if 
there is any basis in the evidence to support that theory." 
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The United States Supreme Court in the case of Mathews v. U.S. 485 
U.S. 58, *63, 108 S.Ct. 883, **887 (U.S.Wis.,1988) held: 
As a general proposition a defendant is entitled to an instruction 
as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. (Citing 
Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 
980(1896)) 
In addition, this court in Salt Lake City v, Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 
1008 (Utah App.1996) held that the defendant "is entitled to have his theory of 
the case presented to the jury "in a clear and understandable way." State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 
75, 78 (Utah 1981)). 
The Utah Appellate Courts have long recognized a defendant's right to 
put on evidence of any reasonable defense. Nearly a century ago, in the case of 
Anderson v. Nielson, 137 P. 152, 156-157 (Utah 1913), the Court was 
presented with a case in which the defendant requested a submission of the 
case on the theory that he was not responsible for the premature releasing of a 
snubbing rope, but the release was a misunderstanding and mistake, while the 
plaintiff requested the theory that the defendant was responsible if the order 
given by him was directed to the men at the snubbing post. The court 
submitted the case on both such theories. The defendant, in addition, also 
requested the court to submit the case on the theory that the failure of the man 
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to release the rope at the rear tackle, and who had been commanded to release 
it, was the cause of the accident. The trial court refused that request, and did 
not submit the case upon such theory. 
The Utah Supreme Court then held that the trial court erred in not 
allowing the defendant's theory and further held: 
".. .the defendant was just as much entitled to go to the jury upon 
that theory as was the plaintiff upon her theory that the proximate 
cause of the accident was the premature releasing of the snubbing 
rope at the direction of the defendant. The charge shows a 
submission of the case upon all the theories of the plaintiff, some 
of which are not even supported by evidence, but the want of a 
submission on theories of the defendant, though supported by 
evidence." Anderson v. Nielson, 137 P. 152, *156 -157 (Utah 
1913) 
In the case at bar, the Defendant was charged with violating a stalking 
order. That stalking order had been issued by a trial court against a pro se 
Defendant, and appealed by the pro se Defendant. The court clerk had made 
an entry in the court record as follows: 
... he says that— it does say that on March 31,'03, it says, filed, 
respondents appeal. But then it says that Virginia [the court 
clerk] called the respondent regarding his appeal. He stated that it 
was an objection to the commissioner's recommendation and that 
additional motions for change of venue will be filed. Per Judge 
Lyon, hold until those further motions are filed. (R. 100 /87) 
The Defendant in the case at bar had a copy of that minute entry and 
requested the trial court to allow him to enter that minute entry into evidence at 
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the criminal trial. This record of a court order from a previous hearing was one 
of the main pieces of evidence as to his theory of the case. The trial court erred 
when it refused to allow defense counsel present the evidence of the court 
order as Defendant's theory of the case. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that "the right of 
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair 
opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that the rights 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own 
behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. Id. In In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), the court identified these rights as among 
the minimum essentials of a fair trial: 
'A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, 
and an opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in 
court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights 
include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against 
him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.' 
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284(1973) (quoting In re 
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)) 
In the present case, the Defendant requested the introduction of a court 
entry from the stalking injunction case. (The very stalking injunction the 
Defendant was charged with violating.) This court docket entry indicated that 
the court clerk called the Defendant concerning his appeal of the entry of the 
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injunction and told him that Judge Lyon had put the matter on hold. The trial 
court refused to allow the introduction of this evidence at trial. Furthermore, 
the trial court forbade defense counsel arguing this theory to the jury. The 
failure to allow the defense counsel to make such an argument violates the 
general principle that a defendant in a criminal case has wide latitude in 
making argument to the jury. The court's refusal to allow admission of this 
evidence and the court's refusal to allow the defendant the opportunity to argue 
his theory to the jury is inapposite to the Defendant's constitutional due process 
rights as described in the cases cited above. 
The Defendant has the right to be heard in his defense. The Defendant 
has "a right to his day in court," which allows him to offer his theory on the 
case and offer relevant testimony or evidence. Prohibiting the defense counsel 
from submitting a prior hearings record deprives the Defendant of presenting 
his theory to the court and that denial violates the Defendant's constitutional 
due process rights. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE 
VIOLATED WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE MADE VAGUE 
AND UNCLEAR STATEMENTS REGARDING COURT 
ORDERS AND FAILED TO NOTIFY THE DEFENDANT 
OF PROSCRIBED CONDUCT. 
The United States Supreme Court has long held that: 
13 
"it is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the 
Due Process clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves 
the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges 
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, 
what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." 
Giaccio v. State of Pa., 382 U.S. 399 (1966). 
This Court has adopted a similar standard under the due process void-for-
vagueness doctrine. That doctrine requires a statute to define an "offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.5' Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 
1991) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 
75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). If an enactment does not clearly define its prohibitions 
and, even more importantly, establish minimal guidelines for its enforcement, it 
violates due process. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App.1991). see 
also State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.1993) 
In City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999), the Supreme 
Court held that "Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two 
independent reasons. First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will 
enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it may 
authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 
In the case at bar, when the trial judge stated "hold until further motions 
are filed," the statement was unclear and vague as to whether or not the stalking 
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injunction would continue to be in place or whether the stalking injunction was 
placed on hold. Applying the holding in City of Chicago v. Morales to the case 
at bar would suggest that vagueness of the trial judge's statement clearly met 
the two reasons to invalidate the stalking injunction. First, it failed to provide 
the notice to the Defendant whether or not his stalking injunction was still in 
place or whether it had been suspended; and second, enforcing the injunction 
when the court order was vague would be arbitrary and discriminatory because 
given the facts of the case at bar, a prosecutor could reasonably interpret the 
court order in two ways, which would result in "arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has long held that a statute will be invalid if 
the language is vague. State v. Gardnier, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991) citing 
State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975). The same standard for 
determining the validity of the statute should also be applied to the validity of 
a court order. In Bradshaw, the court held that a Utah statute making it 
unlawful for a citizen to forcibly resist an illegal arrest was written so as to 
make it unconstitutionally vague. 
The defendant in Bradshaw was charged with resisting arrest in violation 
of the Code. That statute read: "A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
when he [or she] intentionally interferes with a person recognized to be a law 
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enforcement official seeking to effect an arrest or detention of himself [or 
herself] or another regardless of whether there is a legal basis for the arrest." 
Id. The majority in that case struck the statute down as invalid on vagueness 
grounds. The court reasoned that terms such as "regardless of whether there is 
a legal basis for the arrest" and "interferes" could have a number of meanings 
and interpretations. On that basis, the court concluded that the statute "fail[ed] 
to inform an ordinary citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct 
sought to be proscribed." Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 802. 
This court in State v. Hall 905 P.2d 899 (Utah App. 1995) held 
"Vagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., 
whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." State v. 
Frampton, 131 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987). Thus, "[a] statute is not 
unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary 
reader what conduct is prohibited." State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 
1982) (per curiam) (citing State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981)). 
While Defendant recognizes that the vagueness problem that invalidates 
the case at hand arises with the interpretation of whether or not the stalking 
injunction was in effect at the time, the same principles apply as to a statutory 
vagueness issue. Here, the phrase "hold until further motions are filed," could 
have multiple meanings or interpretations. This statement relayed to the 
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Defendant by the court clerk could mean that the appeal was put on hold, or 
that the stalking injunction was put on hold until further motions were filed. It 
is important to note that the court in the stalking case knew it was dealing with 
a pro se Defendant, yet failed to clarify language on which even law trained 
individuals disagree. The statement therefore fails to inform an ordinary 
citizen who is seeking to obey the laws as to the conduct sought to be 
proscribed or prohibited, and the due process implications to this Defendant 
are the same as if the statute itself was vague. 
In addition, the United States Supreme Court as well as Utah Courts 
have often recognized the basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair 
warning of the conduct that it makes a crime. 
In United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954), the court held that 
"The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute 
that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is 
that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could 
not reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id. see also State v. Pelton, 801 
P.2d 184 (Utah App.1990). The same court continued: 
"Thus we have struck down a state criminal statute under 
the Due Process Clause where it was not 'sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will 
render them liable to its penalties.' Connolly v. General Const. 
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Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). We have recognized in such cases that 
' a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in 
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the 
first essential of due process of law/ ibid., and that 'No one may 
be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to 
the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as 
to what the State commands or forbids.' Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
Utah has long recognized that due process requires fair warning of what 
conduct is proscribed by law because engaging in such conduct could lead to 
criminal prosecution, a government action that may result in the deprivation of 
either property (through fines) or liberty (through incarceration). Hansen v. 
Eyre, 2005 UT 29, \ 11, 116 P.3d 290. see also, Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
The Defendant in this case was forced to "speculate at the meaning" of 
the court order. The Defendant could reasonably assume that being informed 
by the court clerk that the judge stated, "hold until further motions are filed" 
means that the stalking injunction is on hold. It is not unreasonable or 
impractical for a person to interpret the judge's statement in that way, 
particularly where we are dealing with a pro se defendant. The failure of the 
court to define the meaning of the judge's vague statement is a failure to give 
the Defendant proper notice or fair warning of the conduct the order prohibits, 
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which failure invalidates the order. Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29, f 11, 116 
P.3d290. 
The Defendant's due process rights were clearly violated when the court 
gave a vague order and failed to give the Defendant reasonable notice of the 
conduct which the court order proscribed; therefore, this court should reverse 
the trial court's ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court 
enforced a vague court order without fair notice of the proscribed conduct, and 
when the court failed to allow the defense counsel to submit reasonable 
evidence during trial. The Defendant's constitutional rights to due process 
were violated. For this reason, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to 
reverse his conviction. 
DATED this 22nd day of October 200/ 
)ALL W. RICHARDS 
)rney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
RONNIE TODD MAY, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061901638 MO 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: February 21, 2007 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : vennaw 
P r o s e c u t o r : WEISKOPF, DAVID E 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARDS, RANDALL W 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 2, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: EWJ 022107 Tape Count: 3:04 
CHARGES 
1. STALKING - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/11/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
COUNT: 3:04 
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Randall Richards. David Weiskopf is present 
representing the State of Utah. Counsel address the Court, and 
sentencing proceeds. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment 
rnio/iQ7noo Page 1 
Case No: 061901638 
Date: Feb 21, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of STALKING a Class A 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in 
the Weber County Jail. The total time suspended for this charge is 
358 day(s). 
SENTENCE FINE 
je # 1 Fine: 
Suspended* 
Surcharge 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
:,al Principal Due 
$555.00 
$0.00 
$268.51 
$555.00 
$555.00 
$0 
$268.51 
$555.00 
Plus Interest 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
cases are on timepay 061901638. 
is to pay $100.00 monthly on the 15th. 
payments scheduled is 5 plus a final payment of 
The following 
The defendant 
The number of 
$64.86. 
The first payment is due on 03/15/2007 the final payment of $64.86 
is due on 08/15/2007. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Ogden Second District Court. 
Defendant to serve 7 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Weber County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by February 26, 2007 by 3:30 a.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 555.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
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Date: Feb 21, 2007 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample to the Weber County Jail, 
paying associated costs, and he shall provide written proof of the 
DNA sample to the court. 
The defendant shall have no contact with the victim and shall abide 
by all terms of the civil stalking injunction that remains m 
effect. 
In addition, a criminal stalking injunction is issued in this case, 
and the defendant is notified that he may request a hearing on 
the injunction. The defendant is restrained from entering the 
residence, property, school, or place of the victim's 
employment, and he is to stay away from the victim and members of 
her immediate family or household, and, the defendant is restrained 
from making contact with the victim personally or through an agent 
initiating any communication 
likely to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written or 
telephone contact with the victim, her employers, employees, fellow 
workers or others with whom communication would be likely to cause 
annoyance or alarm to the victim. 
REVIEW OF COURT PROBATION is scheduled. 
Date: 02/20/2008 
Time: 02 : 00 p.m. 
Location: 4th Floor Southeast 
Second District Court 
2 52 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Dated this <^  / day of 
:E W JONES 
District Court Juc 
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Case No: 061901638 
Date: Feb 21, 2007 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call Stella Perea at (801)395-1062 at 
least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For TTY service 
call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) The general information 
phone number is (801) 395-1079. 
Page 4 (last) 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 061901638 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail RANDALL W RICHARDS 
Attorney DEF 
2 55 0 WASHINGTON BLVD STE 3 00 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
Mail DAVID E WEISKOPF 
Attorney PLA 
23 8 0 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
J ,-• * ^ PTR £ 8 2007 Dated this day of • —' , 20 . 
7 / ) * •• 
Deputy Courti1 C l e r k 
Paqe 1 ( l a s t ) 
ADDENDUM B 
22 
85 
A MATTER OUT OF YOUR PRESENCE, SO IF YOU'LL JUST GO WITH THE 
BAILIFF BACK TO THE JURY ROOM, WE'LL JUST GIVE YOU A SHORT 
RECESS AGAIN. 
(THE JURY LEFT THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. LET'S HAVE RECORD REFLECT THE 
JURY IS NO LONGER IN THE COURTROOM. DID YOU NEED TO MAKE A 
MOTION AT THIS POINT? 
MR. RICHARDS: I DO, YOUR HONOR. I'D LIKE TO MAKE A 
MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE BASED ON THE FACT I DON'T BELIEVE 
THE STATE'S PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OR EVEN WITH THE 
REQUISITE PRIMA FACIE ON ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE. 
WHAT I'M FOCUSING AT ON THIS IS A COUPLE THINGS. NUMBER ONE 
AND PRIMARILY, I PULLED THE RECORD OF THE — THE COURT RECORD 
ON THIS CIVIL STALKING CASE, WHICH IS CASE NUMBER 030901057. 
AND APPARENTLY, THERE WAS AN APPEAL FILED ON THAT AND 
NEVER -- THAT APPEAL WAS NEVER RESORTED IN ANY MANNER. AND 
BASED ON THAT AND BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE THAT 
SAYS A STALKING INJUNCTION IS PRESUMED TO BE VALID, A VALID 
EXISTING ORDER OF THE COURT FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS, 
BASED ON THE FACT THAT THERE WAS AN APPEAL FILED, I DON'T 
KNOW THAT -- AND ALSO BASED ON THE LANGUAGE THAT IS USED THAT 
SAYS — AND I'M LOOKING AT THE APRIL 3RD, '03, WHERE IT SAYS 
PER JUDGE LYON, HOLD UNTIL FURTHER MOTIONS ARE FILED. AND 
THIS IS ON THE APPEAL, THAT THERE WAS NOT AN ACTIVE STALKING 
INJUNCTION IN PLACE, AT LEAST NOT ONE THAT WOULD PUT MY 
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CLIENT ON NOTICE. AND BASED ON THAT FAILURE, WE WOULD ASK 
THE COURT TO DISMISS. 
THE COURT: SO YOUR ARGUMENT IS THAT THE STALKING 
INJUNCTION WAS NEVER IN PLACE AT THE TIME OR --
MR. RICHARDS: WELL, IT WAS ENTERED, AT LEAST ACCORDING 
TO THE RECORD I CAN SEE, THE STALKING INJUNCTION IS 
GRANTED — 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. RICHARDS: — AND THEN THEY FILED THE ORDER ON MARCH 
19TH, '03, AND THEN HE FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL ON THE 31ST 
OF MARCH. AND THEN I SEE A NOTE IN THE FILE THAT SAYS, PEP 
JUDGE LYON, HOLD UNTIL FURTHER MOTIONS ARE FILED. THIS IS ON 
HIS — TALKING ABOUT HIS APPEAL. AND THAT'S APRIL 3RD, '03. 
AND THEN NOWHERE ELSE DOES IT EVER SAY THAT THE APPEAL IS 
DISMISSED OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. AND I THINK BASED ON 
THAT FACT, AND THAT FACT ALONE, THAT THERE'S SOME QUESTION AS 
TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VALID INJUNCTION PRESUMED TO BE 
EXISTING AS AN ORDER OF THE COURT. AND THEREFORE, WE WOULD 
MOVE TO DISMISS ON THAT BASIS. 
THE COURT: SO IS YOUR THINKING THAT BECAUSE THE USE OF 
THE WORD HOLD THAT HE'S HOLDING THE INJUNCTION OR HOLDING ~ 
MR. RICHARDS: I THINK AN INDIVIDUAL COULD MAKE A 
REASONABLE ASSUMPTION FROM THAT IF AN INDIVIDUAL WERE TO LOOK 
AT THE COURT RECORD. 
THE COURT: OKAY. STATE WANNA BE HEARD? 
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1 MR. WEISKOPF: YES, YOUR HONOR. I GUESS MY PROBLEM WITH 
2 THAT IS THAT HE'D ESSENTIALLY BE REQUESTING YOU TO TAKE 
3 NOTICE OF SOMETHING THAT I DON'T THINK THE COURT CAN TAKE 
4 NOTICE OF. I MEAN WE CAN PULL UP THE RECORD, BUT THERE'S 
5 NOTHING THAT INDICATES THAT THE STALKING INJUNCTION WAS 
6 WITHDRAWN, THAT THE COURT ISSUED ANY ORDERS TO THAT EFFECT. 
7 AND THERE'S NOTHING THAT WOULD INDICATE — EVEN AN APPEAL 
8 DOESN'T INVALIDATE THE STALKING INJUNCTION. YOU KNOW, SO 
9 THERE'D HAVE TO BE SOME OTHER ACTION BY A COURT WITH RESPECT 
10 TO THE STALKING INJUNCTION. AND IT'S ENTIRELY SPECULATIVE AT 
11 THIS POINT WHETHER THAT EVEN MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED. AND 
12 THERE'S CERTAINLY NO EVIDENCE AND THERE'S CERTAINLY NOTHING 
13 OF WHICH THE COURT CAN TAKE NOTICE OF AT THIS JUNCTURE. 
14 THE CLERK: JUDGE, THERE'S SOME STUFF IN THE DOCKET, I 
15 DON'T KNOW IF YOU WANT ME TO PRINT IT OUT OR IF YOU WANT ME 
16 TO READ IT, BUT IT SAYS THAT -- IT DOES SAY THAT ON MARCH 
17 31ST, '03, IT SAYS, FILED, RESPONDENT'S APPEAL. BUT THEN IT 
18 SAYS THAT VIRGINIA CALLED THE RESPONDENT REGARDING HIS 
19 APPEAL. HE STATED THAT IT WAS AN OBJECTION TO THE 
20 COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATION AND THAT ADDITIONAL MOTIONS FOR 
21 CHANGE OF VENUE WILL BE FILED. PER JUDGE LYON, HOLD UNTIL 
22 THOSE FURTHER MOTIONS ARE FILED. 
23 THEN THERE'S SOMETHING THAT COMES IN THAT SAYS PETITION 
24 FOR -- AND THEY WRITE RECLUSE OF TRIAL JUDGE AND 
25 RECONSIDERATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS. THE FILE AND ORDER WAS 
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1 SENT TO JUDGE LYON REGARDING THE ORDER TO RECLUSE — MEANS 
2 RECUSE -- AND/OR RECONSIDERATION OF THE COMMISSIONER'S 
3 RECOMMENDATIONS. 
4 THEN SHANNON PUTS A NOTE IN HERE ON APRIL 2 5TH OF '03, 
51 SHE INDICATES FILE WENT TO JUDGE WEST. I ASSUME BECAUSE HE 
WAS THE PRESIDING JUDGE. ORDER FOR RECUSAL IS MISSING A 
MOTION. MENTIONS A REQUEST FOR HEARING, BUT NO FORMAL 
REQUEST IS ATTACHED. IT ALSO MENTIONS A CHANGE OF VENUE, BUT 
91 NO MOTION OR ORDER FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE WAS ATTACHED. PER 
10 JUDGE WEST, THE PETITION FOR RECUSAL IS INSUFFICIENT. THE 
11 RESPONDENT IS TO SUBMIT PROPER PAPERWORK FOR A CHANGE OF 
12 VENUE, FOR HEARING AND/OR RECUSAL, AND (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
13 NOTHING WAS PLACED IN THE FILE. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE? 
15 MR. WEISKOPF: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
16 THE COURT: IT JUST SEEMS TO ME THE ONLY EVIDENCE THAT I 
17 HAVE RIGHT NOW IS I'VE GOT EXHIBIT 1, WHICH IS THE STALKING 
18 INJUNCTION. I WASN'T EVEN AWARE THAN AN APPEAL HAD BEEN 
19 FILED UNTIL MR. RICHARDS BROUGHT IT TO MY ATTENTION. BUT AS 
20 OF RIGHT NOW, THAT'S NOT EVEN IN EVIDENCE, IS IT? OR --
21 MR. RICHARDS: WELL, I THINK THE COURT CAN TAKE JUDICIAL 
22 NOTICE — 
23 THE COURT: I WAS JUST GONNA ASK YOU --
24 MR. RICHARDS: -- BUT IF NOT, I'D MAKE A MOTION TO PUT 
25 IT IN AT THIS POINT THAT THE --
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JUST 
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COURT: OKAY. 
RICHARDS: 
READ -- WELL, , 
THE 
CONSIDER 
TAKE 
MR. 
-- MINUTE ENTRIES, ET 
ALL OF 
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THE MINUTE 
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THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. WEISKOPF: -- YOU THINK IS APPROPRIATE, BUT I'M --
I -- AT THIS POINT, ESPECIALLY WITH WHAT'S JUST BEEN READ 
FROM THE DOCKET, IT'S CLEAR THAT NOTHING VACATED THE STALKING 
INJUNCTION, AND IF HE WANTS TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE 
STALKING INJUNCTION BECAUSE SOMEHOW THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM HERE 
DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT'S NOT AN 
ISSUE FOR THE TRIAL COURT IN HIS VIOLATION OF THE STALKING 
INJUNCTION. 
THE COURT: WELL, AND THE PROBLEM IS, I KNOW THERE WAS A 
STALKING INJUNCTION IN PLACE. WE HAVE THAT. YOU NOW MENTION 
THERE'S BEEN AN APPEAL FILED. WHAT I DON'T KNOW IS WHETHER 
JUST FILING AN APPEAL STAYED THE ORDER. IT SAYS THERE'S AN 
ENTRY ABOUT HOLD, HOLD THE FILE, BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT'S 
SAYING STAY -- STAY THE ORDER UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. I --
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1 MR. RICHARDS: WELL, THEN, I WOULD MAKE A MOTION ON DUE 
2 PROCESS GROUNDS THAT THIS IS SO VAGUE BASED ON JUDGE LYON'S 
3 ORDER THAT IT'S HELD THAT MY CLIENT WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO KNOW 
4 WHETHER OR NOT THAT INJUNCTION WAS IN PLACE. SO BASED EITHER 
5 ON WHAT'S HERE OR ON A DUE PROCESS CLAIM --
6 THE COURT: WELL, BUT HOW DO I KNOW THAT THAT ENTRY 
7 I ABOUT HOLD WAS EVER CONVEYED TO YOUR CLIENT? I DON'T KNOW 
WHAT HAPPENED. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT'S JUST JUDGE LYON 
TALKING TO HIS CLERK SAYING HOLD THE FILE OR HOLD THE ORDER 
101 OR — I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT WENT OR WHO KNEW ABOUT IT. 
11 MR. RICHARDS: BUT ASSUMING IT'S A HOLD OF THE — 
12 THE COURT: RIGHT. 
13 MR. RICHARDS: -- OF THE STALKING INJUNCTION, DOESN'T 
14 MATTER WHETHER MY CLIENT WAS NOTIFIED OR NOT. AND I GUESS WE 
15 COULD PRESUME, AS THE LAW DOES, THAT HE WOULD KNOW ABOUT 
16 THIS. 
17 THE COURT: OKAY. WHAT I'M GONNA DO, I'LL TAKE YOUR 
18 MOTION UNDER ADVISEMENT. I THINK I NEED TO THINK ABOUT IT, 
19 BUT JUST SO THAT I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION AND WHAT IT IS, 
20 YOUR CLAIM IS THAT BECAUSE HE FILED THE APPEAL AND THAT --
21 THAT SOMEHOW THERE WAS NO ORDER IN EFFECT, I GUESS. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: EXACTLY. 
23 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO PUT ON 
24 THE RECORD? 
25 MR. RICHARDS: WELL, JUST THAT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A 
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1 MOTION THAT THIS BE PART OF THE RECORD. AND I THINK WE CAN 
2 DO THAT VIA JUDICIAL NOTICE BECAUSE IT IS AN OFFICIAL COURT 
3| RECORD (UNINTELLIGIBLE) AND I'D LIKE TO BE ABLE TO AT LEAST 
ARGUE IT (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
51 THE CLERK: JUDGE, ALLOW ME TO CLARIFY ONE THING FOR THE 
6 RECORD. THEY WERE NOT MINUTE ENTRIES. THE DIFFERENT — THE 
7 I DIFFERENCE IS THAT THEY DON'T -- THEY DO CREATE A MINUTE 
ENTRY WHERE THEY THEN PLACED IT IN THE FILE AS A HARD COPY. 
91 IT'S IN THE DOCKET. AND SO WHAT HAPPENS, OCCASIONALLY WHEN A 
10 CLERK SPEAKS WITH SOMEBODY REGARDING A CASE, THEY'LL PUT A 
11 DOCKET NOTICE AS TO WHAT HAPPENED, BUT IT WASN'T A MINUTE 
12 ENTRY WHERE IT WAS — 
13 THE COURT: OH, OKAY. 
14 THE CLERK: — FORMALLY ORDERED, SO THE WHOLE DOCKET 
15 WOULD HAVE TO BE PRINTED AND MADE A PART OF THE RECORD. 
16 MR. RICHARDS: AND, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM 
17 WITH (UNINTELLIGIBLE) PAGE (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
18 MR. WEISKOPF: I OBJECT TO THAT. 
19 THE COURT: YEAH, I'M REALLY HAVING A TOUGH TIME WITH 
20 THIS BECAUSE IT SEEMS LIKE — THERE ISN'T ANY EVIDENCE. 
21 WE'RE JUST -- NOW WE'RE JUST TRYING TO READ BETWEEN THE LINES 
22 AT THIS POINT. I'M NOT INCLINED TO LET YOU ARGUE THIS TO THE 
23 JURY. IF ANYTHING, IT'S A MATTER OF LAW, BUT I DON'T THINK 
24 IT'S A QUESTION FOR THE JURY AT THIS POINT AS TO WHAT THOSE 
25 MINUTE ENTRIES OR WHAT THOSE NOTES MEANT. 
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MR. RICHARDS: MAY I RESPOND? 
THE COURT: SURE. 
MR. RICHARDS: I MEAN I — I DON'T WANNA DISAGREE WITH 
THE JUDGE, BUT I GUESS I DO SOMETIMES. 
THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S OKAY. 
MR. RICHARDS: I THINK — I THINK'S IT'S VERY 
APPLICABLE. I MEAN THERE'S TESTIMONY EVEN FROM THEIR 
WITNESSES, DARLENE, THAT SAID SHE DIDN'T THINK THAT THE 
STALKING INJUNCTION WAS EVEN IN EFFECT AS OF FALL OF 2005. 
THAT WAS HER TESTIMONY. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. AND YOU CAN ARGUE THAT. 
MR. RICHARDS: OKAY. AND I THINK THAT WHERE THEY HAVE 
TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE INTENTIONALLY 
VIOLATED IT, IF I CAN BRING UP ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE THAT 
WOULD INDICATE THAT MAYBE HE WAS UNDER A MISTAKEN -- EVEN IF 
IT WAS MISTAKEN, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS MISTAKEN OR NOT, 
FRANKLY --
THE COURT: BUT HOW DO YOU ARGUE THAT WHEN YOUR CLIENT 
HASN'T TESTIFIED? WE DON'T KNOW WHAT HE WAS TOLD OR WHAT HE 
BELIEVED --
MR. RICHARDS: WELL, I 
RIGHT TO NOT TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: ABSOLUTELY, 
HOW CAN YOU ARGUE TO A JURY 
BELIEVED WHEN WE DON'T KNOW 
THINK HE HAS A FIFTH AMENDMENT 
HE DOESN'T HAVE TO TESTIFY, BUT 
WHAT HE WAS THINKING OR WHAT HE 
THAT? 
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1 MR. RICHARDS: WELL, IF YOU SAY YOU CAN'T ARGUE WHAT THE 
2 DEFENDANT'S THINKING OR BELIEVES, THEN I THINK THAT 
3 FORECLOSES THE STATE FROM PUTTING -- FROM ARGUING THAT 
4 THEY'VE PROVED KNOWING OR INTENT ON HIS PART. I MEAN THAT'S 
5 AN ISSUE, CERTAINLY. 
6 THE COURT: IT IS, IT IS AN ISSUE, BUT HOW CAN YOU ARGUE 
7 THAT YOUR CLIENT DIDN'T KNOW OR THOUGHT THAT THIS ORDER HAD 
8 BEEN LIFTED WHEN THERE IS NO TESTIMONY TO THAT EFFECT FROM 
9 HIM? 
10 MR. RICHARDS: WELL, WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT BY VIRTUE 
11 OF FILING AN APPEAL, HE COULD AT LEAST ARGUABLY BELIEVE THAT 
12 THIS WAS ON HOLD UNTIL THAT WAS TAKEN CARE OF. AND WE HAVE 
13 THE JUDGE THAT RATIFIES THAT BY PUTTING IN THE MINUTES THAT 
14 THE HOLD UNTIL FURTHER MOTIONS ARE FILED, AND WE HAVE NOWHERE 
15 THAT SAYS THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED OR ANYTHING ELSE. 
16 THE COURT: WELL, BUT WHAT WE DON'T KNOW IS WHAT THE 
17 EFFECT OF FILING THE APPEAL WAS. AND I JUST — I DON'T KNOW 
18 HOW — I DON'T KNOW WHAT JUDGE LYON MEANT OR WHAT THAT MINUTE 
19 ENTRY MEANS --
20 MR. RICHARDS: AND THAT'S THE PROBLEM. 
21 THE COURT: -- AND THAT'S — WELL, AND THAT'S IT. AND I 
22 DON'T KNOW THAT IT EVER WENT TO YOUR CLIENT OR THAT HE KNEW 
23 ABOUT IT, SO HOW — THE LAST THING ACCORDING TO THE EVIDENCE 
24 THAT YOUR CLIENT KNOWS IS THAT THERE'S AN INJUNCTION, A 
25 STALKING INJUNCTION IN PLACE. HE'S SIGNED OFF ON IT, HE WAS 
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AT THE HEARING, SO ~ 
MR. RICHARDS: AND HE KNOWS HE FILED THE APPEAL. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. RICHARDS: OKAY. 
THE COURT: BUT BEYOND THAT, I JUST — I DON'T — I 
DON'T THINK YOU CAN ARGUE THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS STAYED WHEN 
HE HASN'T TESTIFIED, I JUST DON'T. BECAUSE IT REQUIRES A 
LEAP TO SAY, HERE'S A MINUTE ENTRY FROM JUDGE LYON, BUT HOW 
DO WE KNOW YOUR — THAT WAS EVER CONVEYED TO YOU CLIENT? WE 
DON'T AT THIS POINT, DO WE? THE ONLY THING — THE ONLY THING 
WE KNOW IS THAT AN APPEAL WAS FILED. 
MR. RICHARDS: I MEAN IF YOU TAKE THAT ARGUMENT, HOW DO 
WE PROVE THAT HE WAS EVEN SERVED WITH IT? 
THE COURT: WELL, BECAUSE IT'S PART OF THE -- IF YOU 
LOOK AT THE EXHIBIT 1, THE VERY LAST PAGE, HIS ACCEPTANCE OF 
SERVICE SAYS --
MR. RICHARDS: WE'VE NEVER HAD ANYBODY TO TESTIFY THAT 
THAT'S HIS SIGNATURE — 
THE 
MR. 
NORMALLY 
COURT: 
RICHARDS 
DO THAT. 
WHETHER OR NOT AN 
WELL 
: 
WE 
— 
- AND 
MAKE 
SO WE' 
A 
INDIVIDUAL 
SOMETHING. YOU HAVE ' 
THINK THIS IS — 
THE COURT: WELL 
rO MAKE 
, THE 
LEAF 
RE MAKING 
» IN TRYING 
KNOWINGLY AND 
LEAPS BASED ON 
STATE' S GONNA — 
LEAPS AND WE 
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WHAT 
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30NNA 
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ARGUE HE WAS AT THE HEARING, AND WE'VE GOT A DOCUMENT THAT 
APPEARS TO HAVE HIS SIGNATURE ON THE BACK SAYING, I ACCEPTED 
SERVICE. IF YOU WANNA ARGUE TO THE JURY THAT HE DIDN'T SIGN 
IT, I GUESS YOU CAN --
MR. RICHARDS: NO, WHAT I'D LIKE --
THE COURT: — THERE'S BEEN NO PROOF OF THAT, BUT — 
MR. RICHARDS: WHAT I'D LIKE TO ARGUE IS THAT HE FILED A 
NOTICE OF APPEAL, HE IS -- AND THEN WE COULD REASONABLY 
EXTRAPOLATE FROM THAT THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS ON HOLD AND THIS 
MINUTE ENTRY FROM JUDGE LYON ~ 
THE COURT: YEAH, I — 
MR. RICHARDS: -- WOULD FURTHER SUPPORT THAT. 
THE COURT: I DON'T THINK YOU CAN DO THAT. I THINK 
THAT'S GONE TOO FAR. I THINK YOU CAN SAY — THE RECORDS SHOW 
HE FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL, BUT TO SAY THAT -- BEYOND THAT, 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE — 
MR. RICHARDS: WE WOULD LIKE AT LEAST THAT TO HAPPEN. 
THE COURT: WHAT'S THAT? 
MR. RICHARDS: I'D LIKE AT LEAST THAT TO BE PUT INTO THE 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
RECORD THEN — 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. RICHARDS: — THAT HE FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL, AND 
INFORM THE JURY OF THAT. 
MR. WEISKOPF: I OBJECT TO THAT. I DON'T — I THINK — 
THEN WHAT DO WE SAY, THEN THEY ALSO ADVISED THE COURT THAT HE 
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DIDN'T REALLY HAVE AN APPEAL, THAT HE HAD AN OBJECTION THAT 
HE WAS TOLD TO FILE PAPERS ON AND NEVER FILED IT AND -- IT'S 
JUST TO CONFUSE THE JURY, AND TO PERMIT AN ARGUMENT THAT'S 
NOT — NOT RELEVANT. IT'S SIMPLY TO CONFUSE THE JURY. IF HE 
WANT -- YOU KNOW, AT THIS HOUR, RATHER THAN HAVING 
INVESTIGATED AND DEVELOPED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF — 
THE COURT: I'VE HEARD ENOUGH. I'M NOT GONNA ALLOW YOU 
TO GO -- IT IS, IT'S JUST GONNA CONFUSE THE JURY TO TALK 
ABOUT THE APPEAL AND WHAT THE IMPACT AND THE EFFECT IS. 
THEY'RE NOT GONNA UNDERSTAND WHAT THE APPEAL MEANT AND WHAT 
THE IMPACT WOULD BE, SO I'M NOT EVEN GONNA ALLOW YOU TO GO 
THERE, SO --
ALL RIGHT. ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED TO PUT ON THE RECORD? 
MR. RICHARDS: WELL, I GUESS BASED ON THAT RULING, WE 
REST. 
THE COURT: OKAY. SO THE DEFENSE RESTS. DO YOU NEED A 
FEW MINUTES TO LOOK AT THOSE JURY INSTRUCTIONS? I CAN TAKE A 
SHORT RECESS IF YOU NEED SOME TIME TO GO OVER THOSE. MOST OF 
THEM ARE 
MR. 
PRETTY STOCK. 
RICHARDS: I 
THROUGH THEM. 
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